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ABSTRACT. 
The paper discusses the interactions of changes in income distribution and the 
accumulation dynamics in the post-Fordist accumulation regime in OECD countries, 
which is characterized by deregulated financial markets. The neoliberal mode of 
regulation came with a decisive shift in power relations at the expense of labor, which 
is clearly reflected in the fall of wage shares across OECD economies. The notion of 
a “finance-dominated” accumulation regime is proposed to highlight that financial 
developments crucially shape the pattern and the pace of accumulation. Financial 
globalization has relaxed balance of payment constraints and thereby allowed the 
build up of big international imbalances. The combination of real wage moderation 
and financial liberalization has led to different strategies (or at least outcomes) in 
different countries. While some countries (like the USA) exhibit a credit-fuelled 
consumption-driven growth model that comes with large current account deficits, 
others (like Germany and Japan) show an export-driven growth model with modest 
consumption growth and large current account surpluses. Overall the finance-
dominated accumulation regime is characterized by a mediocre growth performance 
and by a high degree of fragility.  
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
In the second half of 2008 a serious financial crisis that had begun with the bursting 
of the property price bubble in the USA turned into the worst economic crisis since 
the 1930s. This paper contributes to understanding the macroeconomic dynamics 
that underlie the present crisis. In doing so, first, the notion of the neoliberal mode of 
regulation and the finance-dominated accumulation regime, in which the pattern of 
accumulation is shaped by developments in the financial sector, are proposed. This 
accumulation regime is characterized by low and fragile growth. Second, the 
interaction of distributional dynamics and the dynamics of accumulation are 
highlighted. A polarization of income distribution has been an important feature of the 
finance-dominated accumulation regime, even if the macroeconomic effects have 
been different in different countries. While some countries have compensated a 
stagnant demand with debt-financed consumption, others have compensated it with 
increasing net exports. Third, the present crisis and the stagnation of wages for large 
parts of the working classes are intrinsically linked. One underlying cause of the 
present crisis has been the persistent international imbalances and the associated 
massive capital flows.  
 
The notion of financialization covers a wide range of phenomena: the deregulation of 
the financial sector and the proliferation of new financial instruments, the 
liberalization of international capital flows and increasing instability on foreign 
exchange markets, a shift to market-based financial systems, the emergence of 
institutional investors as major players on financial markets and the boom (and bust) 
on asset markets, shareholder value orientation and changes in corporate 
governance (of non-financial business), increased access to credit by previously 
‘underbanked’ groups or changes in the level of (real) interest rates. Financialization 
has also been used to highlight changes of psychological and ideological structures. 
The list could easily be extended. This paper aims at exploring what (some of) these 
changes mean for macroeconomics.2 To do so, the macroeconomic structure will be 
explored by means of the standard Keynesian expenditure function. Aggregate 
expenditures consist of private consumption (C), investment (I), net exports (NX) and 
government expenditures (G): Y = C + I + NX + G.3 Each of these components will be 
investigated to analyze whether changes that can plausibly be linked to 
financialization have occurred and modified the relevant behavioural pattern.  
 
                                                 
2
 Financialization is not the only important change in the macroeconomy. In the relevant period 
globalization and a technological revolution centered around information and communication 
technologies (ICT) have taken place. One limitation of this paper is that it makes no attempt to 
disentangle these effects. 
3
 One can also look at these relations in terms of savings behaviour of the various sectors of the 
economy. The savings of households (SHH), of corporations (SC), of government (SG) and of the 
foreign sector (SF) has to add up to zero: SHH + SC + SG + SF = 0. In other words, for each debtor there 
has to be a creditor. Not all sectors can run a deficit at the same time. Inversely, not all sectors can 
decrease their deficits simultaneously. Note that government savings is the negative of the budget 
deficits (i.e. the budget surplus) and that the savings of the foreign sector, that is capital inflows, is 
equal to the negative of net exports.  
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The argument is presented in a regulationist framework4 to highlight that the 
macroeconomic dynamic (described as the “accumulation regime”) is embedded in a 
particular institutional setting (the “mode of regulation”). While there is a universal 
agreement that the Fordist accumulation regime has come to an end in the course of 
the 1970s, there is no agreement on how to characterize the post-Fordist regime. 
After an initial emphasis on flexibility and, later information and communication 
technology as driving forces of the accumulation regime, financial factors have 
recently received more attention. The notion of a “finance-dominated” accumulation 
regime is proposed to highlight that financial developments crucially shape the 
pattern and the pace of accumulation. The paper argues that these effects of 
financialization give rise to a coherent, if fragile, pattern. 5 
 
In a nutshell, our story is the following. Due to the shift of power relations in the 
neoliberal mode of regulation, income distribution has changed in favour of capital. 
This change in distribution has interacted with macroeconomic changes caused by 
financialization. Important changes have taken place within domestic economies as 
well as regarding their insertion into the international economy. In the finance-
dominated accumulation regime consumption expenditures can become the driving 
force for growth as households gain improved access to credit. This in some 
countries has counteracted the dampening effect of worsening income distribution on 
consumption expenditures and stimulated consumption growth. However this creates 
new potential for instability as servicing high debt levels may become difficult in 
recessions. Investment expenditures are sluggish due to shareholder value 
orientation, increased uncertainty, and the strong (standard) accelerator effects in the 
investment function. Increased profits do not translate into higher investment. 
Financialization has also affected how national economies interact. Deregulation of 
financial markets has allowed to temporarily sustain large current account deficits, 
but also led to an increase of capital flows and, as a consequence, volatile exchange 
rates. This translates into an increase in uncertainty and repeatedly to severe 
currency crises. It also means that some countries have run substantial current 
                                                 
4
 Classical works of the (French) Regulation Theory include Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1985) and Boyer 
(1990). Similarities between the Regulation Theory and the (American) Social Structures of 
Accumulation approach (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982, Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf 1983) are 
now widely recognized (e.g. McDonough and Nardone 2006). The question how national accumulation 
regimes interact has received limited attention within the regulationist approach. Becker (2002) and 
Becker and Blaas (2007) highlight differences along the axes of intraverted versus extraverted 
accumulation and productive versus fictitious accumulation.  
5
 The term finance-dominated rather than finance-led is used to highlight that financialization is 
shaping the pattern of accumulation (or put in another way: the composition of the components of 
aggregate demand and their volatility). Boyer (2000), in a seminal paper, uses the term finance-led, a 
term that is related but different. Boyer defines an accumulation regime as finance-led if an increase in 
the financial norm, that is the hurdle rate set by financial markets for investment projects, leads to an 
increase in growth. No presumption of this sort is made here. Rather a finance-dominated 
accumulation regime is defined in such a way that financialization can positively or negatively affect 
growth. While the term “finance-dominated” has, to my knowledge, not been used before, other 
authors have put forward arguments in a similar spirit. Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005) use the term 
“finance-led” an analysis centering around shareholder value without implying that the finance-led 
regime would automatically give rise to high growth. Brenner (2003) highlights how a boom turned into 
a bubble without invoking the notions financialization or finance-led growth. He highlights the 
importance of international exchange rates policies for the competitiveness of the US manufacturing 
factor. Both contributions also emphasize the instability of the finance-dominated accumulation 
regime. 
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account surpluses while others run deficits. In particular, in several countries a credit-
financed consumption boom with substantial current account deficits has emerged, 
while others have relied on export-driven growth (and subdued domestic 
consumption) and run substantial current account surpluses. Overall the finance-
dominated accumulation regime thus comes with moderate growth in aggregate 
demand and exhibits a high degree of fragility with crises typically emanating from 
international (foreign exchange) or domestic financial markets. 
 
This paper takes a comparative approach with a focus on developments in Western 
European countries. The paper is thus guilty of a strong dose of Eurocentrism. 
However, it contains an important contribution to the debate on financialization. Most 
of the empirical literature (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Brenner 2003, Crotty 2003, 
Krippner 2005) has a focus on the USA. This is because financialization is 
presumably most developed in the USA and because data availability is, for many 
questions, better. However, financialization will have different effects on different 
economies. This is for (at least) three reasons. First, the USA (and the UK) are 
international financial centers and it is not obvious that the financial centers and the 
financial periphery will be affected in parallel ways. Second, financialization is not 
only the result of exogenous developments (say in technology), but it is the outcome 
of policies. As political developments differ in different regions, European 
developments have to be analyzed in their own right. In particular, financial 
deregulation in European countries as well as monetary policy are strongly shaped 
by the particular (neoliberal) path of European integration (Bieler, 2003). Third, 
financial liberalization has allowed for large current account surpluses. For some 
period of time financial liberalization thus has, ironically, increased the potential for 
different developments across countries. In particular, wage moderation has resulted 
in different national strategies (or at least outcomes). In the finance-dominated 
accumulation regime there is thus a credit-driven growth model as well as an export 
driven one. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the background by 
discussing the neoliberal mode of regulation. Sections three, four and five discuss 
potential changes due to financialization in consumption behaviour, investment 
behaviour and net exports respectively. Section 6 looks at changes in government 
expenditures. Section 7 summarizes the macroeconomic pattern resulting from the 
finance-dominated accumulation regime. Section 8 discusses the relation between 
the finance-dominated accumulation regime and the present crisis and section 9 
concludes by highlights how growing inequality has been one of the factors 
underlying the global imbalances that contributed to the present crisis. 
 
1. THE BACKGROUND: A NEOLIBERAL MODE OF REGULATION. 
 
Regulation theory conceptualizes the accumulation process as embedded in a 
certain institutional structure, the mode of regulation. The socio-economic basis of 
the finance-dominated accumulation regime is the neoliberal mode of regulation. 
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Space limitations prevent an extensive discussion of neoliberalism. It will thus have to 
suffice to highlight some key points of the neoliberal mode of regulation.6 
 
First, a shift in power from labor to capital has occurred. Depending on the country 
and region this was due to outright attacks of governments on labor unions (under 
Reagan and Thatcher) or an erosion of the organizational strength of labor (partly 
because of high unemployment in continental Europe) and of increased power of 
capital in part due to more effective threats associated with capital mobility due to 
globalization. This shift in the balance of power is clearly reflected in changes in 
income distribution. Wage shares have been falling across Europe, in Japan and the 
USA (see Figure 1). Moreover, the USA has witnessed stagnant median wages and 
a strong increase of inequality in personal income distribution.7  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Second, a redefinition of the role of the state has taken place. The dominant 
economic ideology has shifted from one of limited, but substantial state intervention 
to one of radical laissez faire. This has provided the justification for a wave of 
privatization and deregulation in many areas. These deregulations range from 
product market deregulation, flexibilization of the labor market to deregulation of 
financial markets. Particularly important with respect to financialization is the 
deregulation of financial markets and a shift in the goal of monetary policy, which 
used to support fiscal policy in its pursuit of full employment during the Fordist 
regime. In the neoliberal regime price stability has become the predominant and often 
the only policy goal of monetary policy. 
 
It is important to realize that neoliberalism does not just mean deregulation, but a 
selective form of deregulation. In many areas a re-regulation is taking place. This is 
most obvious in the case of the European Monetary System, which has been 
regulated and designed in various forms over the past three decades. Neoliberalism 
is the outcome of political decisions. In continental Europe many of these decisions 
were decreed at the European level. The Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the Services Directive, to name but the most important ones, have been crucial 
vehicles to push forward the neoliberal agenda.8  
 
2. CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES. 
 
There are two conflicting effects of financialization on consumption expenditures. 
First the deterioration of income distribution puts a downward pressure on 
consumption, because working class households have a higher consumption 
propensity than earners of capital income. Second, financialization has increased the 
                                                 
6
 One might also call the present accumulation regime a “neoliberal accumulation regime”. At this 
stage the term finance dominated is used to highlight how changes in the financial system affect the 
components of demand. On neoliberalism see Harvey 2006, Glyn 2004, Dumenil and Levy 2004. 
7
 Based (CPI-adjusted) data available from the OECD, median weekly wages have grown by a mere 
2.8% from 1980 to 2005, the bottom quartile of wages fell by 3.1% and the top10% increased by 21%.  
8
 However, this is not to say, that the EU is a homogenous agent in pursuit of neoliberal goals. Rather 
it has its own internal conflicts and contradictions. Van Apeldoorn (1999) has coined the term 
‘embedded neoliberalism’ to describe the predominantly neoliberal orientation of the EU policies that 
at the same time includes social aspects (thus the adjective embedded).   
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access of households to credit. In combination with real estate booms this has often 
led to credit-financed consumption booms. 
 
In the 1990s private consumption expenditures became the main driving force in 
GDP growth in the USA. Indeed, the consumption share in GDP had been increasing 
since the 1970s. Macroeconomists rediscovered the wealth effect to explain this. The 
falling saving rates were thus explained by the rise in the value of financial assets 
because of the stock market boom.9 In the late 1990s a 5% marginal propensity to 
consume out of financial wealth was often quoted (with some more qualification for 
European countries; e.g. Boone et al. 1998). To the surprise of many economists, the 
stock market crash in 2000 did not result in a slowdown in consumption growth. The 
unabated consumption boom in the USA was then explained by booming house 
prices. Residential property was thus identified as the key source of the wealth effect. 
Several studies claimed to find substantially higher marginal propensity to consume 
out of property wealth than out of financial assets (Case et al 2001, Catte et al. 2004, 
Girouard et al. 2006). One of the reasons that housing wealth is supposed to drive 
consumption expenditures is that residential property is more frequently accepted as 
collateral.  
 
While there is substantial evidence for the USA (albeit based on a short period of 
observations!) to back up this story, the evidence on European economies was 
always much thinner. Typically the wealth effects estimated for European economies 
were not statistically significant and/or much smaller. Moreover the US housing 
market differs from those in continental Europe and reliable data on (aggregate) 
house prices is not readily available.  
 
Booming property prices and a mortgage fuelled consumption boom, however, only 
cover parts of how financialization may affect consumption behaviour. More generally 
speaking, financialization has given households more access to credit. Access of 
credit, of course, is not restricted to mortgages, but also includes other forms of 
consumer credit, credit cards and overdraft bank accounts. Consequently household 
debt has been increasing. As there is little systematic literature on changes in the 
marketing policies of banks, it is impossible to say to what extent the higher exposure 
of households is due to their decisions due to improved access to credit because of 
housing wealth and to what extent it is due to more aggressive policies from banks.10 
The USA, the UK, Ireland and Spain experienced property bubbles that were 
accompanied by strong increases in household debt ratios. 
 
                                                 
9
 Brenner (2003, 191) argues that most of the fall in the savings rate (in the late 1990s) occurred in the 
top income groups, who also benefited most from the increase in financial wealth. This, admittedly, fits 
uneasily with the argument made here. Evidence for the early 2000s, however, suggests that the debt 
burden has grown fastest for middle class households (which is in line with our argument) (State of 
Working America 2006/2007). This issue require further research. 
10
 The mainstream literature assumes that households are rational. They increase their debt ratios 
because their wealth increased. While this is probably part of the story, it is also conceivable that a 
substantial part of the accumulated debt is due to households irrationally maintaining consumption 
levels that are unsustainable. As wages have stagnated in many countries, but consumption norms as 
represented in mass media have arguably increased, many households could have been driven into 
debt. Moreover, there is evidence from experimental psychology that the means of payment influences 
consumption decisions: consumers typically buy more when using credit cards. This is another 
indication that debt ratios are in part not due to rational decisions. 
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Household debt is difficult to measure and international comparisons chronically 
suffer from deficiencies in comparability of data due to different financial institutions 
and practices in different countries. Therefore debt ratios should only be compared 
with caution. Table 1.1 summarizes data from Girourard et al. (2006), which contains 
the OECD’s estimates of household debt compared to disposable income. European 
countries display a wide range of debt to income ratios, which may in part be due to 
problems in data comparability. However all European countries (for which data is 
available) have experience rising debt ratios since 1995. Notably the (unweighted) 
average of the debt ratios of the European countries is similar to the USA.  
 
Insert Table 1.1 and 1.2 
 
OECD data also show that (household) savings rates are falling throughout the 
OECD countries, with the most pronounced fall occurring in the USA. Surprisingly, 
however, it turns out that this is not mirrored in the consumption data in Table 1.2, 
which reports private consumption expenditures as percent of disposable income by 
decade.11 While the USA (and Japan) have experienced a substantial and consistent 
increase of consumption compared to disposable income since the mid 1980s, the 
same is not true in Europe. In most countries, notably France and Germany, the 
changes in the consumption share are in the order of magnitude that are within the 
range of a business cycle. There was a strong increase in Greece and a strong 
decrease in Ireland. The (unweighted) average of the EU15 is unambiguously flat 
with no change in the consumption ratio of economic significance.  
 
At the same time European countries have experienced a substantial decline in the 
wage share. As wage incomes are typically associated with higher consumption 
propensities than profit incomes, this ought to lead to a decrease in the consumption 
share. Stockhammer et al. (2009) find a saving differential of around 0.4.12 Given that 
wage shares have declined by some 10 %-points since 1980, consumption shares 
ought to have declined by some 4% points (of GDP) over this period due to income 
distribution. If so, increased debt could have compensated this decline.13 
                                                 
11
 As we lack an exact date for the end of Fordism and the beginning of the neoliberal mode of 
regulation, decades are used for periodization, which gives 10-year averages (except for the 2000s 
where the latest available data is used). These periods are long enough to iron out most of the 
fluctuations associated with the business cycle. The 1970s are the final decade of the Fordist era (or if 
one prefers the period of the crisis of Fordism). Neoliberalism was inaugurated by Margaret Thatcher, 
Ronald Reagan, Helmut Kohl coming to power and coincides with an abrupt shift in monetary policy in 
the late 1970s/early 1980s. In the European context this periodization is convenient because the first 
neoliberal decade (the 1980s) includes the European Monetary and Exchange Rate System (EMS). 
The second neoliberal decade (the “1990s”) begins with the implementation of the Single Market and 
is characterized in terms of economic policy by the Maastricht Treaty and the following Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The final period (the “2000s”) is shorter and therefore may reflect the cyclical 
downturn in this period. Any periodization is arbitrary in detail, however changes in periodization 
should make little difference for the overall picture. 
12
 This value is in line with comparable studies for other groups of countries (Naastepad and Storm 
2006/07, Hein and Vogel 2007).  
13
 There is an additional channel through which financialization may have affected consumption 
expenditures. In many countries the pay-as-you-go pension systems are being reformed or have been 
questioned. Typically some version of a capital-based system is envisioned in which households have 
to invest their savings (usually via funds) in the stock market. This should lead to an increase in 
savings as households have to put more aside for retirement. I am not aware that this channel has 
been investigated empirically.  
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3. INVESTMENT. 
 
Financialization brought about many changes that potentially affect business 
investment (that is physical investment by firms): new financial instruments have 
changed financing patterns, shareholder value orientation affected management 
goals, instability on financial markets could increase uncertainty for firms, to name 
some of them. However, it has been hard to pin down these effects. In part this is 
probably due to the fact that the effects of financialization are difficult to measure, in 
part this may be a mere reflection of the fact that business investment has always 
been the macroeconomic variable that is hardest to explain for economists. 
 
One of the most important changes in investment behaviour is due to the increased 
role of shareholders in the firm. Rather than a management-labor balance (like in the 
Fordist era), firms are now characterized by a management-shareholder balance. 
Several contributions have discussed the microeconomics of shareholder value 
orientation. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that a shift in management 
behaviour from ‘retain and reinvest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’ has occurred. More 
formally, Stockhammer (2004) shows that an increase in shareholder power will 
modify the desired profit-growth frontier for the firm. His estimations suggest that 
financialization may explain a substantial part of the slowdown in accumulation. 
However, results vary widely across countries (strong effects in the USA and France, 
weak effects in Germany).  
 
A second change for investment behaviour has been in the economic environment 
that firms face. Volatility on financial markets has increased substantially in the 
course of financial deregulation. As a consequence firms face a higher degree of 
uncertainty which may make physical investment projects less attractive. In particular 
volatility of exchange rates seems to have had some effects on manufacturing 
investment. However, uncertainty is hard to measure and estimation results from the 
existing literature are not conclusive enough to suggest a clear order of magnitude of 
the effect (Carruth et al 2000, Stockhammer and Grafl 2008). 
 
Firms have overall not used new financial instruments to expand their investment 
expenditures. In the Anglo Saxon countries the buy back of corporate shares has led 
to an overall negative contribution of the stock market to the finance position of non-
financial businesses (Schaberg 1999). Non-financial firms seem to increasingly rely 
on internal finance for investment projects. Overall non-financial businesses seem to 
move from a net debtor position to a neutral or net creditor position. However, data 
on these issues are not readily available or comparable. 14 
 
Here we contend ourselves to highlighting the changing relation between profits and 
investment. In the major economies (Germany, France and the UK as well as the 
USA) the investment/profit ratio shows a clear declining trend. Some countries like 
Greece and Spain show an increasing trend. The unweighted average for the EU 
                                                 
14
 Duménil and Lévy present data for France and the USA. Stockhammer (2004a, Table 5.5) 
summarizes data on several major economies. However, changes in the System of National Accounts 
make it impossible to update the data. OECD (2007) summarizes available data for selected OECD 
countries which confirm that corporations move towards a net lending position. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. The finance-dominated accumulation regime, income distribution 
and the present crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 58-81 
 
66 
countries for which data is available has declined from 47% in the 1970s to 40% in 
the 2000s (see Table 2). 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
As the measure of operating surplus used here (as well as in the National Accounts) 
is a broad one that consists basically of all non-wage incomes, part of the reason for 
the declining trend in the investment operating surplus ratio is due to a change in the 
composition of the operating surplus. Interest and dividend payments have increased 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001, Crotty 2003). However only for few countries, namely for 
the USA, is data readily available. 
While Table 2 is a striking illustration that higher profits do not automatically lead to 
higher investment, this need not be all that surprising. Keynesians have long 
maintained that investment is about expectations rather than profits. Kalecki pointed 
out that the causation may be inverse: investment causing profits, rather than the 
other way. Empirically, profits play a modest role in determining investment. Ford and 
Poret (1991) find no evidence that profits affect (aggregate) investment and 
Stockhammer et al. (2009) report minor effects for the EU12. Onaran et al (2009) 
present econometric evidence for the negative effect of dividend and interest 
payments on investment. 
 
Overall financialization has had a dampening effect on business investment, probably 
due to negative effects of shareholder value orientation and increased uncertainty.15 
Nor is there much evidence that other than in Ireland (and maybe in the Netherlands) 
residential investment has been strongly affected by rising household debt levels.  
 
4. THE FOREIGN SECTOR. 
 
In the aggregate expenditure function the foreign sector is represented by net 
exports. Over longer periods net exports will be balanced for most countries and, 
indeed, for the Euro area as a whole (but not within the Euro area) net exports are of 
a minor magnitude. However, financial liberalization and globalization have allowed 
countries to sustain current account deficits at higher levels and for longer periods 
than previously. The flip side of the current account is net capital flows. It is important 
to realize that (abstracting from changes in Central Bank reserves) net exports have 
to equal (net) capital outflows. Inversely, a current account deficit corresponds to 
capital inflows. Financialization has thus allowed countries to run larger current 
account deficits, provided that they can attract the corresponding capital inflows. 
Indeed the standard deviation of the current account/GDP has increased 
substantially since the mid 1980s (Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
The imbalances in international trade (Table 3) have also played an important role as 
a precondition in the building up of the bubble in the USA. The corresponding capital 
                                                 
15
 Notably, there has been no renewed interest in the effect of share prices on business investment 
(quite in contrast to the research on consumption expenditures and share prices). As in the early 
1990s (Chirinko 1993, Ford and Poret 1992), most empirical economists would probably agree that 
share prices have little, if any effect on investment. 
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flows have provided vast amounts of capital in search of yield in US$ assets. These 
they found in various derivatives based on mortgage and commercial credit, thereby 
fuelling the credit-financed consumption boom. Without capital inflows the bubble in 
the USA would probably not have inflated as much as it did. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Financial liberalization and globalization has thus, ironically, increased the potential 
for different developments across countries – if only as long as international financial 
remain calm. However the capital flow that underlie the trade imbalances may 
abruptly halt or reverse and thereby cause severe crisis. The macroeconomic 
dangers of volatile capital flows have so far been felt mostly in emerging economies. 
Mexico 1994, Turkey 1994 and 2001, several countries in the course of the South 
East Asian crisis 1997/98, and Argentina 2001 are all examples of such crises related 
to capital flows. All of them have led to severe recessions (at times with double digit 
declines in real GDP), some of them long-lasting, others more short-lived.16 However, 
the EMS crisis 1992/93 also shook developed economies (although the exchange 
rate devaluations were not as strong, nor were the following recessions.) 
 
The reason why changes in the exchange rate have such a devastating effect is that 
in liberalized international markets it is usually profitable to engage in interest 
arbitrage, that is borrow in one currency and invest or lend in another (often called 
carry trade). If, say, interest rates in Turkish Lira are higher than those in Euros (with 
exchange rates expected to be stable), it is tempting to take out a euro credit and 
lend in Turkish lira. By implication, assets and liabilities will then be denominated in 
different currencies (a related risk is that of the maturity of assets). An abrupt 
exchange rate realignment may then have disastrous effects on firms’ or banks’ 
balance sheets.   
 
International exchange rate arrangements seem to be key to understanding the 
accumulation and growth dynamics in the finance-dominated accumulation regime. 
For Europe, the most important institutional change in this area of course was the 
EMS (which effectively ended with the 1992/93 crisis) and European Monetary 
Unification. The introduction of the Euro was a reaction to the EMS crisis, where 
several countries had to devalue their currencies by some 20% (vis à vis the Deutsch 
Mark). At first, the Euro appears to have been a success. Not only was the new 
currency accepted by the public, but the Euro system also eliminated (nominal) 
exchange rate fluctuations and thereby the possibility of exchange rate crises. It also 
substantially decreased inflation and (real) interest rates in the formerly soft-currency 
countries. However, since inflation differentials persist across European countries, 
there have been creeping changes in real exchange rates that have accumulated 
over the years. Real exchange rates have diverged since the introduction of the 
Euro.17 Germany has devalued by more than 20% in real terms vis a vis Portugal, 
                                                 
16
 The fact that some countries recover quickly after a deep recession, does not imply that everything 
returns to pro-crisis. Onaran (2009) argues that financial crises often lead to lasting changes in 
functional income distribution. 
17
 Presumably not all countries entered the Euro with the ‘correct’ exchange rate. In particular Deutsch 
Mark is often thought to have entered overvalued. However, if the real exchange rate realignments 
since 1999 were a correction of the initial values, one would expect the real exchange rates to stabilize 
after a while. As of now there is no indication for that. 
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Spain, and Ireland since 1999. This will pose a major challenge in the coming years, 
as the only way how these countries could gain competitiveness (in the absence of 
productivity miracles) is by keeping their inflation well below German rates for 
extended periods. But as German core inflation is already close to zero, this would 
imply deflation in these countries, which would require mass unemployment and 
falling wages. Europe has reacted to the liberalization of capital flows by introducing 
a common currency. While this has ended the risk of exchange rate crises, trade and 
cost-related imbalances are building up within the Euro area and there seems to be 
no mechanism for resolving these imbalances. 
 
5. THE STATE. 
 
Downsizing the state was high priority on the to-do-list of neoliberals when they came 
to power in the 1980s and thereafter. Or at least so they claimed. It is remarkable that 
state shares in expenditures and receipts have not been reduced dramatically in 
OECD countries during the neoliberal era. In Figure 3, government total expenditures 
are depicted as % of GDP (source: OECD Economic Outlook database). While the 
rise of the state sector has clearly been halted after 1980, the state share has 
remained at the (historically) high level of the late 1970s. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
Only in three countries (Ireland, UK and the Netherlands) are state shares lower than 
they were in the 1970s. In most countries (and the median) state shares have 
increased until the early 1980s and stagnated thereafter. Given that most countries 
experienced a neoliberal hegemony of one form of another and the cut back of the 
state was one of the neoliberals’ prime goals, this resilience of big government may 
be called the neoliberal puzzle.18 
 
This does not mean that neoliberal hegemony has not affected the state. It has. State 
owned enterprises are not counted as state sector in the National Accounts and 
therefore most privatizations will not show up in the data.19 Furthermore deregulation, 
not the least in the financial sector, has taken place. As it does not affect the 
economic size of the state it, again, will not show up in the data, even though the 
state influence in the economy may have decreased. What is measured as the size 
of the state sector here is in fact the size of state employment and transfers (and in 
some countries military expenditures). It thus includes the welfare states as well as 
government bureaucracy. Overall it is thus still remarkable how stable state shares 
have been. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Crotty (2003, 2005) also uses the term neoliberal puzzle and defines it as “financial markets 
demand that corporations achieve ever higher profits, while product markets make this result 
impossible to achieve” Crotty (2003, 271). Crotty’s neoliberal puzzle refers to the economic structure, 
where the notion used in this paper refers to economic policy making. 
19
 The details may depend on the legal setting. Private firms owned by the state are not counted in the 
public sector. Firms that are institutionally part of the state (as in many cases the postal service) is 
counted. 
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6. THE OVERALL MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. 
 
We can now summarize the findings on the finance-dominated accumulation regime. 
For continental European countries one does not find the strong evidence of a 
consumption boom (related with a property price bubble) that has been reported for 
the USA – despite the fact that household debt levels increased substantially. 
Consumption ratios are stagnant. However, given that income distribution has 
changed at the expense of labor, which should have decreased consumption ratios, it 
is plausible that debt-driven consumption has also fuelled demand in Europe to some 
extent.20 Investment as such has not been a driving force of demand. In particular 
rising profits have not translated into rising investment. Presumably (but hardly 
conclusively) this is related to shareholder value orientation and increased 
uncertainty due to volatile financial markets. Liberalization of capital flows has 
relaxed current account-constraints on countries and led to volatile exchange rates, 
which however, have not translated into a severe crises in Europe (with the exception 
of the 1992/93 EMS crisis) as they did in South East Asia, Latin America or Turkey. 
The Euro system has effectively prevented currency crises. However, the Euro came 
with a policy package, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
has fostered neoliberalization within Europe and led to a creeping divergence within 
Europe. Macroeconomic developments have thus been strongly influenced by 
exchange rate arrangements.  
 
Overall the effects of financialization thus give rise to a finance-dominated 
accumulation regime that is one of slow and fragile accumulation. However, 
remarkably it has not led to a severe recession in Europe. Indeed mainstream 
institutions argue that the business cycle has become moderated (IMF 2006). Given 
our discussion so far, one might wonder why recessions have not been more harsher 
and more frequent. We might call this the Minskyian puzzle, as Hyman Minsky 
asserted that unregulated financial markets are prone to endogenous instability.  
 
7. WHY HAVE RECESSIONS SO FAR NOT BEEN MORE SEVERE IN 
OECD COUNTRIES? 
 
There are two related reasons to expect that the finance-dominated accumulation 
regime would lead to more volatility in output growth (and other macroeconomic 
variables). First, macroeconomic shocks from the financial sector have become more 
severe and more frequent. There is ample evidence that financial markets generate 
highly volatile prices. Overshooting is well established for exchange rates and the 
boom bust cycles of share prices has become evident (again) in the past years. 
Second, because of high debt levels, the fragility of the economy has increased. 
Financialization has encouraged households to take on more debt. This debt 
presumably either has fuelled consumption expenditures or was necessary to buy 
property in the face of soaring house prices. Either way, debt has to be serviced out 
of current income (or by ever increasing debt). Even temporary reductions in income 
may thus escalate if households have to default on their loans. While this need not 
happen necessarily, the fragility of the system has increased as the resilience of 
households against temporary shocks has decreased. 
                                                 
20
 There is little evidence however, that this debt, much of which is mortgage debt, has caused a 
substantial increase in residential investment. The latter is falling as a share of overall investment. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. The finance-dominated accumulation regime, income distribution 
and the present crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 58-81 
 
70 
One would expect that this combination of more frequent crises on financial markets 
and high fragility of households to translate into macro economic volatility. However, 
overall, it is not clear whether growth has become more volatile (in OECD countries) 
in the finance-dominated accumulation regime. IMF (2007) presents evidence that 
business cycle have become more moderate since the 1970s. The devil, however, 
lies in the detail. While “output volatility (…) has been significantly lower than during 
the 1960s” (IMF 2007, 85), recessions have become harsher in the Post-Bretton 
Woods era than in the Bretton Woods era (IMF 2002, Table 3.1). As output growth 
(and expansions) was much higher in the Fordist era than in the post-Fordist era, the 
IMF is correct in concluding that volatility has decreased. But this does not mean that 
recession have become less severe! Indeed, financial crises, have become more 
frequent and more severe (Eichengreen and Bordo 2003).21 It is important to keep in 
mind that price variation of many financial variables (such as prices of shares or 
derivates) have little direct impact on macroeconomic behaviour. Exchange rates 
seem to have strong and immediate impact only in the case of drastic changes. 
Currency crises and banking crises tend to have the strongest economic impact, 
stock market crises only a moderate one (see also Claessens et al 2008).  
It is important to note that state shares are still substantially higher than at the time of 
Great Depression and, as pointed out, the neoliberal era has not reduced them 
substantially. Automatic stabilizers are thus in place and government consumption 
forms a sizable part of value added. Moreover, Central Banks in ACCs (in particular 
the Fed) have been pro-active in reacting to dangers of financial crisis. The resilience 
of a sizable government sector and (by historical standards) a functional welfare state 
combined with adept monetary policy may be the reason, why financial crises have 
so far not had a devastating effect on (advanced) economies. 
 
8. THE PRESENT CRISIS. 
 
In September 2008 serious tensions on the financial markets turned into the worst 
financial crisis since the 1930s. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers core financial 
markets froze and only state intervention on an unprecedented scale prevented a 
total collapse of the financial system. However, state interventions were neither 
sufficient to stabilize the financial system nor to prevent the financial crisis to spread 
to the real sectors. Indeed, at the time of writing the world economy is facing the 
worst recession since World War II.  
 
The financial crisis initially began in the subprime mortgage market (in the USA), a 
small segment of the mortgage market. However, by now the losses related to 
subprime mortgages (and the securities based on them) are only a modest fraction of 
the total (expected) losses to the financial sector. For example in Oct 2008 the IMF 
(2008) estimated the total losses 1400 bn US$, of which only 85 bn are directly 
related to subprime loans (including Alt-A loans) but 500 bn are related to mortgage 
backed securities (ABS and CDOs, excluding prime MBS). Clearly the subprime 
crisis was the trigger rather than the main cause of the crises. 
 
One of the main drivers of the crisis was a huge property price bubble (in the USA, 
but also in the UK, Ireland and Spain). Real estate bubbles are prone to have strong 
                                                 
21
 In particular Eichengreen and Bordo report that there had been no banking crises in the 1945-73 
period. 
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real effects, because ownership of real estate is relatively widespread (compared to 
the ownership of other financial assets) and because real estate is widely accepted 
as collateral (again compared to other financial assets) by banks. Mortgage lenders 
trusted that property prices would continue to appreciate (Gerardi et al. 2008) and 
extended credit on an increase in the value of a property, which effectively fuelled 
consumption expenditures. These equity withdrawals amounted to no less than 10% 
of labor and transfer income in 2003-06 (DiMartino and Duca 2007, Chart 7). Banks 
also relaxed their lending standards, which in turn fuelled property prices. This 
process was supported by financial innovation, in particular by securitization of 
mortgages in mortgage backed securities, which allowed mortgage lenders to sell the 
loans and get them off their balance sheets. This has been called the originate and 
distribute model of banking.  
 
The debt-driven consumption boom resulted in huge current account deficits (of USA, 
but also of Ireland and Spain). Contrary to how economics textbooks have it, these 
did not lead to a depreciation of the currency, but to huge capital inflows. The origin 
of these capital inflows were China (and other South East Asian countries such as 
Korea), Germany and Japan, which had substantial current account surpluses. For 
the South East Asian countries this was part of an economic strategy to increase 
their foreign exchange reserves after they had experienced their vulnerability to 
capital flow reversals (and insufficient reserves) in the Asian financial crisis 1997/98. 
In Germany it was part of policy of wage moderation that aimed at improving 
competitiveness. 
 
As is well known, capital inflows (while often praised by the proponents of financial 
liberalization) are hard to digest for the domestic economy and capital inflow 
bonanzas usually lead to a short-lived boom that ends in economic crisis (Reinhart 
and Reinhart 2008). While the present crisis in the USA did not originate from a 
capital flow reversal and currency crisis (as in the developing countries), it did 
experience a bubble in real estate and financial assets (much like the developing 
countries) and a consequent bust. 
 
9. CONCLUSION: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND THE UNDERLYING 
CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. 
 
The polarization of income distribution is closely linked to the international 
imbalances that underlie the present crisis. The median working class household has 
experienced stagnant wages in most developed countries. Certainly consumption 
norms (as spread through mass media) have increased faster than median wages 
(Cynamon and Fazzari 2009). Combined with a weak investment performance this 
has led to shortfall of private demand. Effectively (but not necessarily by intention) 
two different strategies have emerged: In Anglo-Saxon countries the shortfall of 
disposable income has been compensated by credit and increasing debt levels. The 
property boom allowed households to take out loans that they could not afford given 
their income, but that seemed reasonable to banks which assumed that property 
prices would continue to increase. These countries developed a credit-financed 
consumption boom that came with current account deficits. The resulting capital 
inflows again fuelled the property bubble and bubbles in other financial markets.  
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In the second group of countries median working class household faced a similar 
stagnation in wages. In these countries private consumption expenditures remained 
weak. Here net exports played the key components of demand growth. Thus these 
countries developed an export-led growth model.  
 
The same phenomenon, stagnation in real wages, had different effects in different 
countries. Moreover, the two growth models rely on each other: the credit-driven 
consumption model implies current account deficits and thus will only work, if there 
are surplus countries. Inversely, the export-growth strategy will only work, if there are 
deficit countries that absorb their exports. The current account imbalances were 
made possible by financial globalization and the liberalization of capital flows.  
 
This analysis has important policy implications. As wage moderation has been one of 
the structural causes underlying the present crisis, one condition for re-establishing a 
viable growth regime, is a change in wage policy. Wages have to increase at least 
with productivity growth. This would stabilize domestic demand in the surplus 
countries and allow to avoid a collapse of consumption demand in the deficit 
countries. A more egalitarian income distribution is not luxury that can be dealt with 
once the economy has been stabilized, it is an integral art of a sound macroeconomic 
structure.  
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Table 1 
 
Table 1.1 Household debt as percent of 
disposable income 
Table 1.2 Private consumption expenditures 
as percent of disposable income 
 1995 2000 2005  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Belgium     0.63 0.67 0.63 0.63 
Denmark 188 236 260  0.63 0.65 0.62 0.59 
Germany 97 111 107  0.64 0.66 0.69 0.70 
Greece     0.63 0.70 0.75 0.74 
Spain 59 83 107  0.72 0.73 0.70 0.70 
France 66 78 89  0.63 0.66 0.65 0.66 
Ireland  81 141  0.73 0.75 0.68 0.62 
Italy 32 46 59  0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 
Luxembourg     0.64 0.59 0.55 0.53 
Netherlands 113 175 246  0.59 0.60 0.59 0.58 
Austria     0.66 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Portugal     0.79 0.75 0.74 0.78 
Finland 64 66 89  0.64 0.65 0.66 0.61 
Sweden 90 107 134  0.56 0.57 0.59 0.56 
United Kingdom 106 118 159  0.69 0.71 0.73 0.72 
         
EU uwa 91 110 139  0.66 0.67 0.66 0.65 
United States 93 107 135  0.70 0.73 0.76 0.80 
Japan 113 136 132  0.61 0.64 0.67 0.71 
         
Note: Data for Denmark, Spain and Japan refer to 2004 rather 
than 2005. 
Note: Germany refers to West-Germany before 1991. 
Source: Girourard et. al. (2006) Source: AMECO   
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Table 2 
 
Investment as % of operating surplus 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Austria 59% 50% 47% 44% 
Belgium     
Denmark 46% 47% 46% 49% 
Finland 57% 57% 41% 36% 
France 46% 46% 42% 43% 
Germany 52% 48% 42% 35% 
Greece 24% 24% 26% 36% 
Ireland 50% 44% 30% 28% 
Italy 41% 36% 31% 33% 
Luxembourg 39% 48% 51% 50% 
Netherlands 48% 39% 38% 38% 
Portugal 37% 35% 31% 34% 
Spain 47% 40% 44% 47% 
Sweden 59% 52% 46% 51% 
United Kingdom 55% 48% 44% 42% 
     
EU uwa 47% 44% 40% 40% 
USA 46% 44% 39% 39% 
Japan 58% 59% 61% 56% 
     
Note: Investment is private gross fixed capital formation. EU is an unweighted average of 
available EU countries 
Source: OECD National accounts    
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Table 3. Current transactions surpluses and deficits as % of GDP in 2007 
 
 2007 
Germany 7.6% 
Ireland -5.4% 
Spain -10.1% 
United Kingdom -3.8% 
USA -5.2% 
Japan 4.8% 
Source: AMECO 
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Adjusted wage shares in the Euro area, the USA and Japan
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Figure 1 
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Standard deviation of current account as % of GDP across OECD countries
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Figure 2. Standard deviation of the current account as % of GDP across OECD 
countries 
  
 
Source: AMECO 
 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. The finance-dominated accumulation regime, income distribution 
and the present crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 58-81 
 
81 
 
Figure 3. Government expenditures as percent of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Note: Government total disbursements, OECD Economic Outlook dataset  
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